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Introduction 
Trade relations between the United States (U.S.) and Mexico are becoming 
increasingly important ever since January 1, 1994 when Mexico, Canada, and the U.S. 
entered into the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).  In the agriculture 
sector, Mexico is a net importer of agricultural products and imports most of its corn and 
sorghum solely from the US.  For example, Mexico imported 195,056 metric tons of 
white corn from the U.S. in 1995.  By 1999, it imported 1,072,896 metric tons of white 
corn from the U.S., an increase of 450 percent.  In the case of white corn, trade barriers 
exist that add a measure of uncertainty to the transaction between exporter and importer.  
Trade uncertainty reduces trade volume and prices in the origin market and increases the 
prices in the destination market (Gallagher 1998).   
With the advent of NAFTA, tariffs on many agricultural products were lowered or 
are in the process of being lowered.  U.S. and Canadian corn has restricted access into the 
Mexican market until 2009, with Mexico having to allow an increasing amount of corn 
into the country every two years from ratification (Josling 1997).  Mexico implements a 
duty-free quota for U.S. corn.  This quota is divided among the various importers in 
Mexico with “cupos”, which are import license permits.  U.S. exports to Mexico in 
excess of this quota are assessed a tariff that in 1998 was $135 per metric ton.  The tariffs 
are to be phased out by 2009. 
The objective of this study is to identify factors that determine the likelihood of 
issuing licensing permits for white corn and the quantity allocated through import 
permits.  To accomplish this objective the probability that an import permit will be issued 
is estimated using a tobit model.  The tobit model is estimated using monthly data from   3 
1994 to 2000.  This is used to determine the probability that a white corn import permit 
will be issued and its affect on the quantity allocated.   
Import permits are generally allocated to four main industries: starch, corn flour, 
tortilla, and livestock.  Import permits are also issued to the state food distribution 
agency, CONASUPO.  These groups are generally in favor of import permits being 
issued and lobby the government to allocate import permits to their respective industries.   
On the other hand, corn and sorghum producers and peasant associations have in 
general been opposed to the issuance of import permits.  They believe that to allow corn 
to be imported tariff free undermines the prices they would receive for their domestic 
crop.  Another group that is opposed to tariff free corn imports is sugar producers and 
manufacturers.  This group states that manufacturers of high corn fructose syrup have an 
advantage because they import corn at a lower cost and then invade their market. 
It is the purpose of this paper to determine if pressure from these groups affects 
the allocation of import permits and the probability that import permits will be issued.  In 
this fashion it will be possible to truly determine if the allocation of import permits is a 
political process and a barrier to free trade.  The following section is a brief history of 
agricultural trade policy in Mexico.  The literature review then covers some public choice 
and uncertainty analysis work that directly relates to this paper.  The conceptual model, 
data, and empirical model follow and the results and conclusions finish the paper. 
 
Agricultural Trade Policy 
The Mexican Economy and agricultural sector have gone through many reforms 
in the twentieth century.  It has suffered through revolution, earthquakes, and several   4 
currency devaluations.  The instability of the economy due a lack of political stability and 
protectionist programs had a profound effect on Mexico’s agricultural sector.   
Import licenses were required under the import substitution policy instituted by 
the Mexican government after World War II.  This protectionist policy controlled foreign 
exchange with a system of multiple exchange rates and trade tariffs that averaged 27 
percent with a maximum of 100 percent.  Mexican agricultural and national programs 
were designed to protect low-income producers, ensure food security, and protect urban 
wage earners (Mielke 1989; Garcia 1996).   
These programs influenced agricultural production and trade through domestic 
prices (guaranteed minimum farm prices, trade volume controls, and exchange rate 
manipulation) and subsidization of production (input subsidies, preferential interest rates 
on agricultural credit, subsidized crop insurance premiums, and irrigation subsidies) 
(Mielke 1989).  Price controls and subsidies affected food, feed, and fiber consumption.  
Agricultural markets were regulated by a state-owned enterprise (SOE) called 
CONASUPO the national commodity marketing board and food distributor, which 
bought basic crops (such as corn and dry beans) and foodstuffs for cheap distribution 
through a network of its own stores (Garcia 1990).  CONASUPO consisted of 18,000 
retail stores, 32 manufacturing and food processing operations, and accounted for 70 
percent of the food storage facilities (Belejack 1990; Shwedel 1991).  Other SOEs, 
engaged in the production and/or the distribution of agricultural products were 
INMECAFE (coffee), TABAMEX (tobacco), FERTIMEX (fertilizer), PRONASE (seed), 
and AZUCAR (sugar) (Garcia 1996; Mielke 1989).   
Agricultural trade was and is still controlled by licensing requirements, import 
tariffs, and export subsidies.  Agricultural imports were affected through the private   5 
sector and CONASUPO, which imported for its own account and resold some 
commodities to the private sector.  By the end of 1988, Mexico was in its final stages of 
trade liberalization ushered in by its formal GATT membership in 1986.  Licenses were 
required on 27 percent of imported items, the average tariff was 19 percent, and the 
maximum tariff was lowered to 40 percent.  By the time formal NAFTA negotiations 
started, licenses were required on only 12 percent of imported items, average tariffs were 
10 percent and the maximum tariff was 20 percent (USITC 1990). Trade reforms had a 
limited effect on agriculture, since 80 percent of Mexico’s agricultural imports still 
required an import license.  Volume controls were still in effect for major imported 
grains, oilseeds, and dairy products (Mielke 1989). 
Faced with a declining agricultural sector the Salinas Administration in early 
1991 unveiled a four-year agricultural modernization plan called the National Program 
for the Modernization of the Countryside (PROCAMPO).    Part of the program and a 
component of the debt-restructuring agreements involved selling off all or parts of the 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs).  The sell of parts of the food processing division of 
CONASUPO in 1990 actually began the process of privatization.    
Agricultural reform has been difficult due to the existence of two distinct farming 
systems: traditional agriculture (subsistence production of edible corn and dry beans by 
peasant farmers) and commercial agriculture (exportable tropical products, fruits, 
vegetables, and livestock products).  The government has prevented the market of staple 
grains such as corn from operating independently by keeping a not so invisible had in the 
market.  It is an intermediary between producers and millers and also buys basic 
commodities for its own account since it owns 70 percent of the country’s storage 
capacity (although millers must only pay for the grain and not the storage) (Garcia 1990).    6 
 Mexico is a net importer of agricultural products and imports most of its corn 
solely from the U.S. (Reynolds 1984).    Reynolds states that trade relations between the 
U.S. and Mexico are ones of increasing interdependence and importance.  This 
interdependence increased when Mexico, Canada, and the United States entered into the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) on January 1, 1994.  Josling (1997) 
states that free trade is the absence of deliberate tariff barriers, non-tariff barriers such as 
quotas, and any discriminatory policy against imported goods.  He goes on to state that 
governments are unlikely to allow such an ideal situation to arise.   
“Nevertheless, NAFTA has had an impact on grain marketing in Mexico.  For 
example, prior to NAFTA, millers were required to buy grain from the government 
without regard for the quality or variety of grain.  In 1993, millers purchased 90 percent 
of their corn from the government’s marketing agency.  In 1994, however, with the 
inception of NAFTA, the quality problem with government owned grain encouraged 
millers to purchase private grain, which was competitively priced (prior to the 
devaluation)” (Garcia 1990). 
With NAFTA, tariffs on many agricultural products were lowered.  Although corn 
will have restricted access into the Mexican market until 2009, with Mexico having to 
allow an increasing amount of corn into the country every two years from ratification 
(Josling 1997).   The Mexican government controls agricultural imports through licensing 
requirements, tariffs, and export duties (Smith 1984; Mielke 1984).  The overall controls 
are determined by a committee within the Secretariat of Commerce and Industrial 
Development (SECOFI) and none are issued until the domestic crop has been purchased 
(Mielke 1989).  The Mexican government’s aim of using import licenses is to avoid 
displacing domestic production.  One of the main problems of this licensing policy and   7 
the basis of this study is that the terms of the import license are subject to change without 
notice, thereby adding uncertainty to the trade flow of white corn between the U.S. and 
Mexico. 
Despite the economic cost, the political price of an open border policy in corn 
would be excessive because of its central role as a subsistence crop for most of Mexico’s 
peasants.  Although, ending government intervention in the market would affect all 
consumers it would disproportionately affect the poor.  According to Garcia (1990) 
tortillas and flour may be subsidized by as much as 40 percent.  Small tortilla shops sell 
to low-income consumers and supply 60 percent of the market while industrial tortilla 
producers sell to high-income consumers in urban areas. 
Several groups have been on opposing sides for the liberalization of the corn 
market.  Since the ratification of NAFTA in 1994, these groups can be placed into two 
general categories, those opposing the issuance of import permits because of fear that 
corn imports will damage domestic producers and those for the issuance of import 
permits because of a need for low cost inputs of consistent quality.  The different groups 
that have been historically for and against import permits can be characterized as three 
distinct groups: (1) producer groups and peasant associations, (2) industrial processors, 
and (3) sugar manufacturers. 
Beginning with producer groups, they have historically been against the issuance 
of import permits as they regard lower priced U.S. corn as a rival in their market.  It has 
been shown that completely liberalizing a commodity market does have a detrimental 
affect on Mexican producers.  For example, Bivings (1997) showed that the liberalization 
of the sorghum market in Mexico hurt Mexican producers who could not compete with 
U.S. sorghum imports.  The Mexican government did not re-instate import permits in this   8 
case but did put in place seasonal tariffs on imports, domestic price controls, and a 
storage subsidy scheme (Bivings 1997).  Therefore, producers are very wary of U.S. 
imports.  However, Mexico as stated previously is a net importer of corn so the 
government has not choice but to allow imports (especially after its became a member of 
NAFTA).  In its effort to appease the producers the government has tried to institute a 
policy of not issuing permits during the domestic harvest in an attempt to avoid 
displacing domestic production and keeping prices high.   
This, however, has not always worked as producers have continuously protested 
the issuance of import permits and the distribution of those permits.  Producer groups led 
by the Consejo Agrario Permanente (CAP), have lobbied for the inclusion of producers in 
the decision making process for when, how, and how many import permits will be issued.  
They have continually protested that SECOFI and the Cupo (import permit) Committee 
have always consulted with industrial groups but leave producers out of the process.  The 
import permit committee is made up of SECOFI officials, industry representatives, and 
CONASUPO. 
The group more consistently consulted about import permits has been the 
industrial users of corn.  This group includes the livestock industry, the industrial 
producers of tortillas, the corn flour industry, and the starch industry.  These groups have 
historically lobbied for import permits to be issued in a consistent manner.  Of the four 
industrial groups mentioned the starch industry is the group that always gets their import 
permits issued.  The starch industry includes large companies such as Almidones 
Mexicanos (ALMEX) that have ties to companies in the U.S such as Archer Daniels 
Midland Company (ADM) and A.E. Staley Manufacturing Company.  The starch 
industry is the only industry to be issued import permits consistently, quarter after   9 
quarter.  This may be because it usually imports yellow corn and is not a direct 
competitor in the white corn market.  Another heavy hitter in this group is Gruma, which 
has a 70% share of the corn flour market in Mexico.  Gruma is also a 22% owner of 
ADM. 
The third group that has historically expressed an interest in corn import permits 
is the sugar group.  This group consists of manufactures of high fructose corn syrup 
(HFCS) in Mexico, which normally lobby for corn import permits and sugar 
manufacturers in Mexico that normally lobby against import permits.  Sugar 
manufactures in Mexico have claimed that the NAFTA negotiations worked against them 
since the U.S. restricts sugar imports and although sugar imports will increase they do so 
only if the Mexican demand for sugar increases (including demand for HFCS) but 
Mexico has an obligation to increase its corn imports significantly.  They claim that not 
only is their export market restricted but also a low cost competitor has entered their 
market (Mena 1997).  Devadoss, Kropf, and Wahl (1995) concur that the establishment 
of a corn sweetener market and the substitution of HFCS for sugar in Mexico will 
decrease Mexican sugar consumption. Like the industrial manufacturers of corn tortillas, 
the manufacturers of corn sweetener and HFCS lobby for the issuance of import permits.  
They claim that in order to compete in the market they must be allowed to import high 
quality low-cost inputs that include corn. 
 
Literature Review: Public Choice and Uncertainty Analysis 
Public Choice 
According to Krugman (1995) political factors have played a dominant role in the 
growth of would trade since in end of World War II.  Rausser and Freebairn (1974) also   10 
stated that public decision makers must choose between alternative policies that influence 
different sectors of society in various ways and which have different welfare effects on 
society.  However, given that voters do not as a rule make international trade policy 
especially between election cycles, government officials are susceptible to pressure 
groups.  Before Olsen’s (1965) article, the role of interest groups were thought of as an 
informative one, that is, that interest groups informed politicians on issues that were 
important to the electorate but would not have otherwise gained any attention until the 
politicians came up for elections.  However, since interest groups do not have the same 
access to politicians, the role is no longer that of informant but of pressure group.  Since 
the interest group with the most access will have there interests met.   
Rowley (2001) gives two conditions that make collective action feasible when 
associated with effective leadership that apply to the interest groups in this paper (1) the 
group must be small and homogeneous and (2) the group must be able to force the supply 
of pressure by any means.  These two conditions apply to both the producer associations 
and the industrial groups that are pro and anti the liberalization of corn.  
Since free trade is thought to be efficient, any barriers to free trade have to be 
attributed to the political process.  Grossman and Helpman (1994) conclude that 
industries with higher import demand or export supply elasticities will have smaller 
deviations from free trade and that protection will reflect the political strength of the 
interest groups involved in a particular issue.   In their 1995 article, Grossman and 
Helpman added that politically motivated governments tilt negotiations in trade talks with 
other governments toward their most organized interest groups.  This can be seen clearly 
in the NAFTA negotiations between the U.S. and Mexico concerning the sugar and corn 
policies.  Tariff rates will reflect the strength of both the domestic and foreign interest   11 
groups.  Protection will be particularly high when the domestic interest group is strong 
and the foreign interest group is weak, in relative strength in each country.   
Expanding further on political factors, interest groups influence ATBs in several 
ways.  For corn, lobbying producer groups are in direct conflict with lobbying importer 
groups.  Grossman and Helpman (1994) showed that competing lobbies prefer to tie the 
hands of the government through inefficient protection policies such as import quotas.  
Including the size and number of corn producer associations and importers is a way to 
quantify the relative strength of their lobbying power with the Mexican government.  
Another potentially important determinant is the makeup of the oversight committee 
issuing the permits.  Finally, recognizing changes in government regimes may also be an 
important part of the political process that governs import permits.   
Uncertainty Analysis 
Trade uncertainty exists when access to the import market is not assured and 
obscures marketing firm behavior and margins for internationally traded agricultural 
commodities (Gallagher 1998).  There have been several analyses that study the role of 
uncertainty in agricultural marketing (McCalla 1967; Krugman 1987; Pick 1990; 
Miljkovic 1999).  Hennessy (1995) found that quality and volume controls are often used 
to ensure orderly marketing in markets with inelastic demand and unpredictable supply.   
Gallagher (1998) considered marketing margins and trade determination in the 
presence of trade uncertainty.  Although Gallagher states many causes that may distort 
price alignment the main concern of the study is what he terms administrative trade 
barriers (ABTs).  ABTs are classified as licenses, health restrictions, exchange rate risk, 
and import classifications, or any import procedure that appears or disappears when 
market conditions change.     12 
The corn import license is the administrative trade barrier that will be studied in 
this paper as it is issued as market conditions change.  Gallagher (1998) finds that the 
equilibrium and structure of trade in the market changes when there is uncertainty about 
the success of the transaction.   He finds that the margin decreases when the probability 
that the transaction will be success is high.   
Gallagher concludes that trade uncertainty reduces trade volume, reduces prices in 
the origin market, and increases prices in the destination market, thereby reducing total 
welfare.  Trade uncertainty, which is the chance that a commodity transaction will not be 
successful, is a trade barrier (Gallagher 1998). 
  There have been few models that have empirically tested the effect of trade 
uncertainty on agricultural trade.  Many models such as the one by Gallagher (1998) are 
theoretical in nature.  Goodwin, Grennes, and Wohlgenant (1990) incorporated 
expectations into an empirical investigation of the law of one price directly applicable to 
international agricultural commodity markets.  They contend that international 
commodity arbitrage and trade occur over time as well as across spatially separated 
markets.  They conclude that firms face price uncertainty due to delivery lags and when 
these lags are considered, expected future prices must be included in the analysis.  
  Miljkovic (1999) established that the law of one price in international trade might 
not hold when there is trade uncertainty due to: (a) pricing-to-market; (b) exchange rate 
risk, choice of currency denomination of export prices, and price responses to the 
exchange rate changes; and (c) effects of geographical separation of markets, including 
transportation costs, trade regionalization, and other institutional factors, tariffs, and non-
tariff barriers.  Pricing-to-market (Krugman 1987) occurs when exporters price   13 
discriminate across destination markets and export prices depend on bilateral exchange 
rates. 
  A model that incorporates exchange rate risk, a form of trade uncertainty, was 
formulated and estimated by Pick (1990).  He analyzes the effects of exchange rate risk 
on U.S. agricultural exports to ten different countries including Mexico.  Pick assumes 
that the demand for imports is a derived demand, where the imports are used in the 
domestic production of the final goods.  This assumption is appropriate for white corn 
since it is an intermediate good used in the production of masa (flour) for tortillas.  The 
results showed that exchange rate risk adversely affected U.S. agricultural exports to 
Mexico.   
Conceptual Model 
 
Mexico produces mainly white corn for human consumption and yellow corn and 
sorghum for feed.  Production and storage inefficiencies however, make Mexico a net 
importer of these commodities.  No model for white corn could exclude either yellow 
corn or sorghum.  White corn is traded at a premium to yellow corn and sorghum is 
traded at a discount to yellow corn.  White corn can be substituted for yellow corn for 
feed if the price is right (i.e., white corn in 2000 had a premium that was almost zero in 
relation to yellow corn due to overproduction).  Also, white corn and yellow corn are 
interrelated as the same import permit is issued for both commodities.  Sorghum as a 
substitute for yellow corn is also correlated with the white corn.  No import permit is 
needed for sorghum thereby making it a substitute for yellow corn when import permits 
have not been issued or are not available to certain industries.  Also, at a certain price   14 
ratio, sorghum will automatically be substituted for yellow corn, as the protein in corn 
will no longer make up for the price difference between the two commodities.  
The Mexican government’s aim of using import permits is to avoid displacing 
domestic production (Interviews; Mielke 1989; Garcia 1990).  Therefore, the issuance of 
import permits is a highly political and uncertain process.  The Secretariat of Commerce 
and Industrial Development (SECOFI) issues the import license permits through a Tariff 
Commission (import permit committee).  Import permits are not issued until the domestic 
crop has been purchased (Mielke 1989), which is reflected in equation (1) for white corn. 
The likelihood of a market transaction a probability function is specified as   
(1)  ( ) ,, rr r= w fMLZ    
where M are macroeconomic variables, L represents political factors, and Zr are 
production variables. For example, macroeconomic variables could be exchange rates or 
total imports to proxy macroeconomic conditions.  Political factors could include 
information related to size and number of interest groups or trade agreements that involve 
the U.S. or Mexico (Grossman and Helpman1994).  Important production variables are 
domestic production and seasonal aspects of production.  
 
Marginal Effects 
  In order to give an intuitive feel for how these socio-political aspects can affect 
the probability of import permits being issued and how this in turn affects price some 
marginal effects are shown in the following equations.  Equation (3) shows how an 
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As production in Mexico increases the import demand for corn will decrease, thereby 
decreasing the probability that import permits will be issued.   






As pressure from producer associations in Mexico increases the probability that import 
permits will be issued decreases.  Some of the pressure tactics that producers have used in 
the passed have included blocking U.S. trains at the border in Nuevo Laredo (Laredo, 
TX) and Ciudad Juarez (EL Paso, TX).  This tactic of blocking trains and causing already 
heavy traffic areas to come to a stop has worked several times in getting the attention of 
SECOFI and the Import Permit Committee and getting them to grant producers access to 
the process of issuing import permits (Quintero 1999). 
  In contrast, Mexican importers lobby to get import permits issued at times when 
they think they will need them the most.  Historically, importers have had more of an 
influence year round on SECOFI since they were normally consulted when plans for 
import permits were being made.  Following this line of thought I would expect that as 
pressure from importers mounts the probability of import permits being issued increases 









Data and Empirical Model 
 
Data were collected from various sources.  The quantity of white corn, yellow 
corn, and sorghum inspected for export to Mexico per month from 1994 to 2000 was 
obtained from United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) Federal Grain Inspection 
Service (FGIS).  Total U.S. exports to Mexico, which include agricultural and   16 
nonagricultural goods, were obtained from the U.S. Department of Commerce.   Mexican 
corn and sorghum production in metric tons was obtained from the Food and Agricultural 
Organization (FAO) of the United Nations.  Import permit allocations by industry were 
obtained from the Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS) of the USDA from 1994 to 2000.  
The five industries to which corn import permits are allocated are the livestock industry, 
starch industry, the corn flour industry, the tortilla industry, and CONASUPO.   
All grain exported outside of the U.S. must be inspected by the Grain Inspection 
Service of the USDA.  Therefore, if no inspections of white corn took place in a certain 
month then no white corn was exported during that month.  It is assumed that after 
inspection white corn is not stored for export in another month.  The export variables 
should also capture other reasons why exports would not occur such as currency 
devaluations.   
Mexico has two harvest seasons for corn.  The first harvest is in May through July 
(spring) and the second harvest season is October through December (fall).  Production 
quantity was divided between these two seasons while also adding an extra month to each 
season.  For example, the spring season had the greatest quantity concentration in June 
and July and May and August would have some production divided between them.  In 
other words, if production for spring of 1994 was 30,000 metric tons, June and July 
would each have 10,000 metric tons and May and August would each have 5,000 metric 
tons.  As the production in Mexico increases I would expect that the probability of having 
a successful transaction would decrease since import permits are issued after domestic 
production is exhausted.  Negative articles in the medial are a proxy for producer 
pressure to halt imports.  Most of the negative articles were referencing corn and   17 
sorghum producers pressuring the government to halt imports.  The rest of the negative 
articles dealt with sugar producers unhappy with corn imports.    
The probability that import permits are allocated is estimated using a tobit model.  
Equation (5) states that the factors that affect the probability that a white corn import 
permit will be issued and in turn the quantity of permit issued. 













where the variable permit denotes the quantity of export inspections per month of white 
corn.  The variable W1 is a quadratic time trend, W2 is yellow corn inspected in metric 
tons, W3 sorghum inspected in metric tons, W4 is total exports to Mexico (agricultural 
and non-agricultural products), W5 is Mexican production of corn in metric tons, W6 is 
Mexican production of sorghum in metric tons, W7 is producer pressure to stop imports, 
and b are parameters to be estimated.  The variable Wik8 is a binary variable which 
denotes whether or not import permits have been allocated to the five corn importing 
industries.   
  Yellow corn and sorghum inspection are expected to have a positive impact on 
the allocation of white corn import permits.  Total exports are also expected to have a 
positive impact on the allocation of white corn import permits.  These three variables can 
not only proxy for macroeconomic variables such as exchange rate but if yellow corn and 
sorghum exports are occurring then one would expect that white corn imports would have 
a higher probability of occurring. 
  Domestic production of corn and sorghum are expected to have negative impacts 
on the allocation white corn import permits.  As shown in the marginal effects as 
production increases the demand for imports will decrease thereby decreasing the   18 
probability that import permits will be issued.  Producer pressure is also expected to have 
a negative affect on the issuance of import permits.  One would tend to think that as 
producer pressure increases the government cuts back on the allocation of import permits.  
The only expected affects regarding industry pressure is that the corn flour and tortilla 
industries would have a positive affect on white permit allocations, as would 
CONASUPO.  The starch and livestock industries would only import yellow corn so their 




The summary statistics for the variables used in the tobit model to determine the 
probability of white corn import permits issued are shown in Table 1.  The results of the 
tobit model for white corn import permit allocations are shown in table 2 and the 
marginal effects are shown in Table 3.  Neither the linear nor quadratic time trends are 
statistically significant.  On the whole however the time trends indicate that as you go 
from January to December the import permit allocations increase. 
The results indicate that as expected export inspections of yellow corn and 
sorghum have a positive impact on the probability that a white corn import permit will be 
issued.  These variables are also statistically significant at the one percent level.  This 
would indicate that concurring export of sorghum and yellow corn increase the 
probability that white corn import permits will be issued and increase the allocation 
quantity.  Total exports also have a positive impact on import permit allocation but it is 
not statistically significant.   
Domestic production of corn and sorghum both have negative impacts on the 
probability that import permits will be issued.  Although, sorghum production is   19 
statistically significant at the one percent level and corn production is not statistically 
significant.  Producer pressure and pressure from the corn flour and livestock industries 
are not statistically significant.  Pressure from the tortilla industry is statistically 
significant at the five percent level and positive as expected.    CONASUPO is also 
positive as expected and statistically significant at the one percent level.  In other words, 
both CONASUPO and the tortilla industry have positive affect on the probability that 
white corn import permits will be issued.  Pressure from these two groups will increase 
the amount of import permit issued.  The marginal effects indicate that pressure from the 
tortilla industry will increase import permit allocations by 17,459 metric tons and 
pressure from CONASUPO will increase import permit allocations by 30,719 metric 
tons.   
On the other hand, the starch industry has a negative affect the probability that 
import permits will be issued and is statistically significant at the five percent level.  
Therefore, as pressure from the starch industry increases (this industry imports yellow 
corn only) the probability that white corn import permits will be issued decreases.  Also 
the effect of the starch industry is that the amount of import permit issued will decrease.  
In other words, pressure from the starch industry could decrease white corn import permit 
allocations by 27,135 metric tons.  It is interesting to see that CONASUPO when it 
applies pressure has a greater impact on import allocations than any other factor.  This 
makes sense since CONASUPO is the governmental agency and it can cut back its 
imports at a moments notice. 
   20 
Conclusion 
  Agricultural trade policy in Mexico has changed from import substitution to trade 
liberalization.  Within its trade liberalization policy it has sold almost all of it’s state 
owned enterprises, yet the Mexican government keeps a tight control over its basic grains 
such as corn.  An open trade policy for corn would have great political implications since 
it is a subsistence crop for most of Mexico’s peasant population.  The Mexican 
government would have to liberalize the tortilla market if it were to liberalize the corn 
market and that would have serious repercussions for all consumers and especially the 
poor.   
  With the advent of NAFTA, Mexico is under the obligation to import corn from 
the U.S. at an ever increasing quantity under a tariff rate quota that stays in place until 
2009.  However, in order to avoid displacing domestic production Mexico distributes this 
quota through import permits allocated to five main industries.  These industries are the 
starch industry, the tortilla industry, the livestock industry, the corn flour industry, and 
the Mexican national buying agency, CONASUPO.   
This paper tries to determine the factors that affect the probability that a white 
corn import permits will be issued.  The factors included in the model are export 
inspections, total exports, domestic production, producer pressure to stop imports of 
grains into Mexico, and industry pressure to have import permits issued.  We find that the 
following variables are statistically significant: export inspections of yellow corn and 
sorghum, production of sorghum in Mexico, pressure from the tortilla and starch 
industries, and pressure from CONASUPO.  The variables that negatively impact the 
probability that import permits will be issued are the production of sorghum in Mexico 
and pressure from the starch industry.   21 
From the results we can determine that political pressure and production do have 
an impact on the probability that a white corn import permit will be issued.  We also 
determine that depending on the industry the impact can be positive or negative.  
Therefore, it is not only enough to know that all importers will in general want to have 
import permits issued, but also know which industry is lobbying for the import permits.  
As the results show the starch industry which imports only yellow corn could actually be 
countermining the tortilla industry that imports white corn in regards to whether yellow 
corn or white corn import permits will be issued.   
The underlying theme for the authors is the fact that institutional aspects can and 
do affect private markets.  This is our attempt to begin linking private markets with 
political markets.  Understanding the uncertainty that comes through the political market 
and help to diminish the risk associated with it in the private market.    
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Table 1:  Summary Statistics For White Corn Tobit Model 
Variable  Mean  Standard Deviation 
White corn insp.  47217.099  51839 
Yellow corn insp.  264894.09  167060 
Sorghum insp.  169989.97  102400 
Total exports  5980.3119  1862 
Mexican corn production  1516094.8  1245600 
Mexican sorghum production  457494.82  88947 
Producer pressure  1.583  1.6635 
Corn flour industry  0.654  0.4783 
Tortilla industry  0.440  0.4994 
Starch industry  0.750  0.4356 
Livestock industry  0.595  0.4938 
CONASUPO  0.357  0.4820 
 
 
Table 2:  White Corn Estimates for Tobit Model 
Variable  Coefficient  Standard Error  P[|Z|>z] 
Linear time trend  1998.7836  1491.8607  0.1803 
Quadratic time trend  -15.9763  16.6963  0.3386 
Yellow corn insp.  0.1316**  0.0298  0.0000 
Sorghum insp.  0.2035**  0.0596  0.006 
Total exports  6.1749  6.7618  0.3611 
Mexican corn production  -0.0006  0.0039  0.8726 
Mexican sorghum production  -0.2763**  0.0980  0.0048 
Producer pressure  827.8269  2339.4353  0.7234 
Corn flour industry  11545.3559  15104.670  0.4447 
Tortilla industry  20038.9243*  10809.361  0.0638 
Starch industry  -31145.6581*  14447.335  0.0311 
Livestock industry  15302.2561  12293.066  0.2132 
CONASUPO  35259.9438**  11076.878  0.0015 
 ** Denotes statistical significance at the 1% level 
  * Denotes statistical significance at the 5% level 
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Table 3: Marginal Effects For White Corn Import Permits 
Variable  Coefficient  P[|Z|>z] 
Linear time trend  1741.3893  0.1824 
Quadratic time trend  -13.9189  0.3409 
Yellow corn insp.  0.1147**  0.0000 
Sorghum insp.  0.1773**  0.0006 
Total exports  5.3797  0.3640 
Mexican corn production  -0.0005  0.8726 
Mexican sorghum production  -0.2407**  0.0051 
Producer pressure  721.2232  0.7234 
Corn flour industry  10058.5977  0.4434 
Tortilla industry  17458.4031*  0.0648 
Starch industry  -27134.8624*  0.0315 
Livestock industry  13331.7014  0.2132 
CONASUPO  30719.3292**  0.0016 
** Denotes statistical significance at the 1% level 
* Denotes statistical significance at the 5% level  24 
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